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Incorporating a feminist analytical framework, we examine, from a longitudinal and generational 
perspective, public support for the euro. Feminist critiques of EMU argue that narratives around the 
adoption of the euro, the impacts of austerity, as well as the economic recovery have to a large 
extent ignored women’s experiences. In light of these critiques, we examine the empirical evidence 
indicating growing support for EMU even after the crisis. Specifically, we examine how women’s 
experience as participants in the labour force, as well as in the household, influence their support for 
the euro. We find that the youngest cohorts had significant declines in support post crisis but that the 
gender gap in support is smaller where labour force experiences are more similar. 
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 Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), seen as a process of deepening European 
integration, offers a unique opportunity to examine the differential impacts of these processes on 
women (see Elman 2002,  Kronsell 2005). In early studies, we identified a number of economic and 
social forces at work in support for the single currency and economic union (Banducci, Karp and 
Loedel. 2003; Banducci, Karp & Loedel 2009). Studies have also identified a number of dynamics 
of EMU support post crisis (e.g. Hobolt, Leblond, Bermeo and Bartels, 2013; Hobolt and Watril 
2015). A constant in all studies, pre- and post-crisis, is the finding that, even after controlling for all 
observed socio-economic differences, women are less supportive of  EMU than men are. In 
analyzing these differences and what drives this gender gap, we draw on a feminist analytical 
framework (Karamessini and Rubery 2013; de la Porte, Caroline, and Elke Heins 2016; Kantola and 
Lombardo, 2017; Cavaghan and O’Dwyer, 2018). Moreover, given the unequal impact on women of 
policies to address the debt crisis, in particular austerity measures, we aim to develop a more 
nuanced and layered understanding of how austerity has influenced support for monetary union 
among women across generations.  
 Using extant public opinion data and macro-level economic and social policy indicators and 
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theories drawn from economic self-interest, financial insecurity and gender role norms (e.g. Gidengil 
1985), we examine these gender differences across Euro Area members. First, we examine 
generational cohorts of men and women and their support for EMU. We argue that this approach is 
important for understanding the emergence (and disappearance) of gender differences. We know that 
gender relations have evolved over time. While there may be separate gender and generational 
effects, Lyons, Duxbury & Higgins (2005) suggest that the ‘two should not be considered in isolation 
of each other’ (p. 763).  
 Second, we focus our analysis on the impact of austerity on support for the EMU using a 
framework that draws on generational experiences with European integration. We define austerity as 
the set of policy prescriptions associated with cuts in public expenditures, notably reducing social 
welfare programs and public sector employment (e.g. privatization) as well as demanding flexibility 
in terms of employment. These measures often impact women more harshly, whether in terms of 
unemployment, or returning to work as caregivers, or taking on lower waged employment (and 
temporary employment). Thus, we must ask whether these austerity programs have a differential 
impact on women’s support of monetary union.  After twenty years of EMU, we can better assess 
this support over time and through the lens of gender (see also Enderlein and Verdun, 2009, for a 
broad overview of EMU at ten years). 
 
Gender and Austerity in the European Monetary Union 
 There is recognition that consideration should be given to gender (‘mainstreamed’) in scholarly 
debates about European integration (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000).  Plehwe, Walpen, and 
Neunhoeffer (2006) argue that women was key majority that did not back the Treaty on European 
Union (Maastricht) in the 1990s and that this gender deficit in support for the EU project has persisted. 
Well documented research (most notably Karamessini and Rubery, 2014; Kantola and Lombardo 2017) 
also shows that women are less likely to gain from the neoliberal policies framing European 
integration. Cavaghan and O’Dwyer (2018,) argue that ‘the gender constitutive effects of the EU’ are 
clear and conclude that the EU ‘ignores women as economic citizens and actors’ (p. 96). More 
specifically on EMU, Elman (2002) has argued that lower levels of support for European integration 
among women is not surprising given that ‘women comprise both a significant majority of Europe’s 
least privileged and service sector employees’ (chap7). Despite these and other developing research 
streams, the great majority of studies have dealt with EU integration as a gender-neutral process 
(Liebert, 1997, MacCrae 2010). Consequently, feminist scholars claim that although gender is a main 
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organizing principle of social relations, it is an under-researched in EU studies (Kronsell, 2005; 
O’Dwyer 2018).   
 This gender blind spot is particularly acute in the case of austerity. The convergence criteria 
enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, in particular for initial entry into the Euro Area, demanded 
adherence to limits on fiscal expansion, and the Stability Pact of 1995 required countries maintain strict 
rules on debt, deficits, and inflation once they have joined the Euro Area (Howarth and Loedel, 2005). 
With the launch of the euro in 1999, the restrictive macroeconomic policies (deficit reduction, debt 
ceilings, privatisation) remained the defining rules for policymakers into the 2000s. This set of policy 
parameters came into sharp relief with the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis 
in the Euro Area. The 2012 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (or Fiscal Compact for 
short) introduced an even stricter set of oversight and rules on Euro Area member states. The Fiscal 
Compact further enforced the concept of the ‘debt brake’ meaning stricter austerity measures if deficit 
and debt criteria were not met by member states (see also XXXX in this issue for a in depth account of 
these dynamics).  
 Against the background of these events, EU economic policy is often presented as gender 
neutral (O’Dwyer 2017). However, the impacts of austerity – and the “flexibility” and “adjustment” of 
austerity programs -- are not gender neutral. Public sector cuts hit women harder because women are 
more likely to use public services and more likely to work in the public sector. They are more likely to 
do the unpaid work to compensate for cuts in services – such as caring for children or older family 
members – with consequences for their own employment and earnings. Women are over-represented in 
care work, rely on public supports such as child benefits, family payments, and career allowances, and 
public employment. Benefits and tax credits, which were often reduced as a result of austerity policies, 
constitute a larger share of women’s incomes due to their care-giving roles. As Cavaghan and O’Dwyer 
(2018, 746) note: “the idea of austerity is that it performs a discursive obfuscation of the gendered 
realities of the economy, and of its material impacts on people, especially women, in that economy” (p. 
746).  Women act as a “buffer demographic” and are “expected to take up the slack resulting from 
public sector cuts” (Cavaghan and O’Dwyer, 2018, 748).  Austerity removes critical support for 
vulnerable populations (women overall, but even further across race and class; for a strong 
intersectional analysis, see Kantola and Lombardo, 2017).  While not a member of the Euro Area, a 
British (House of Commons, 2017) study found that men in the UK will have borne just 14% of the 
total burden of austerity driven welfare cuts, compared with 86% for women.  Employment flexibility 
and adjustment to austerity are difficult for anyone, but if women appear, as Charness and Gneezy 
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(2012) demonstrate, to be more financially risk averse than men, how are they going to be able to 
adjust? This may be even more pronounced in countries targeted under excessive deficit procedures 
(see Notermans,and Piatonni and Pagoulatos in this issue).  
  Further evidence from Ireland following the 2008 housing market and banking collapse 
demonstrates the gendered impact of austerity imposed from 2010-2014. Wöhl (2017) notes that the 
systematic cut back of social services, including housing supports which hit single mothers the hardest, 
squeezed women on a number of fronts. Rent supplements, social housing cutbacks, and tax policy 
focused child benefit payments all had substantial negative impacts on women. It is true that men 
suffered higher and more immediate effects in terms of unemployment (especially in market sensitive 
housing construction and manufacturing), but the austerity measures soon wore on vulnerable women. 
Housing evictions soon followed and mortgage defaults among women increased significantly. In 
Spain, another country particularly impacted by the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis (notably in the 
banking sector), the recession quickly shifted from “he-cession” to a “she-cession (see Lombardo, 
2017). O’Dwyer’s (2018) study, as well as Kantor and Lombardo’s edited volume (2017), focus on the 
context of post-crisis implementation of austerity plans and programs across Euro Area member states 
and suggest that these gendered aspects of austerity and it impact should be more fully analyzed. 
Gender, Generations and EMU 
In our analysis, we take up the call to examine the gendered impact of austerity on European monetary 
policy by focusing on the gendered dynamics of public support for the Euro over the past 20 years of 
monetary union. We argue that in considering public opinion over time, it is important to take seriously 
socialization experiences across generations. The extant research on the impact of the financial crisis 
and austerity on support for EMU has not drawn on a generational framework to understand the 
dynamics of opinion. There are at least two reasons why a generational approach, and one that 
explicitly takes into account gender, is useful. First, we can account for what are period effects of the 
economic crisis and austerity that have influenced everyone’s levels of support for EMU from what are 
generational effects that would depend on the experiences of the formative years. Period effects of the 
financial crisis and austerity on EMU support have been well demonstrated – the financial crisis 
bolstered support within the Euro Area relative to outside the Euro Area (Hobolt and Leblond 2014) or 
only marginally decreased support for the time immediately after the crisis (Rother et al. 2015). In 
noting a shift from identity-based to economic considerations, Holbolt and Watril (2015) write “…the 
crisis demonstrates that public opinion on integration might be more dynamic and responsive to the 
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changing nature of the integration process than stylized theories predict. This should be reflected in 
future studies as we continue to advance our models of public opinion formation on European 
integration by taking seriously the impact of the political and economic context (p 256).” By bringing 
together generational and period effects, we can account for both the political and economic context of 
the formative years and the effects of the financial crisis.  
Second, because theories of EMU support draw on situational explanations such as employment status 
and education background, when examining gender gaps over time, it is necessary to take into account 
how gender roles have shifted over time. Inglehart ad Norris (2003) attribute the shifting gender gap 
that sees women’s political support move from the right to the left of men over time to “increased 
female participation in the paid workforce, the break-up of the traditional family, and the 
transformation of sex roles in the home” (p 75). These changes in the economic positions of women 
mean that younger generations of women are more left leaning while older generations are more right 
leaning.  Shorrocks (2018) finds a similar generational patter though attributes these generational shifts 
to secularization. The generational changes in economic positions are likely to have implications for 
support for European integration generally and EMU support specifically. 
Addressing generational shifts in support for European integration, Anderson and Reichert (1996) 
write,  because ‘initial moves toward integration in the 1950s were led by a generation of politician 
who sought to avoid another military conflict in the heart of Europe, it seems reasonable to conjecture 
that older generations – especially among the original size members of the EU – are more supportive of 
integration than the younger ones who do not have an equivalent historical referent’ (p 236). On the 
other hand, Wilson (2011) identified the ‘Erasmus’ generation, a term he used to describe younger 
generations who have “enjoyed the practical benefits of European integration, are highly mobile, think 
of themselves as European citizens and consequently are a base of support for further European 
integration” (p 1). Downs and Wilson (2012) argue that generational differences in exposure to 
autonomous decision making by states will be linked to Euroscepticism (p 436). They explain that 
younger generations whose experience with European integration is one where common markets, a 
European court of justice and mobility are simply the status quo and are therefore less likely to have 
sovereign states as a reference point. Thus, they are less likely to be eurosceptic and more likely to 
identify as European than older generations. It is important to note that these generational effects are 
different from the effects of aging which would suggest that citizens become more Eurosceptic as they 
age (see Gabel 1998, for example) where conflicting patterns have been found. Down and Wilson 
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argue that research showing conflicting effects of age are actually resolved when one considers the 
impact of generations.  
In a follow up to Downs and Wilson, Fox and Pearce (2017) argue that increasing support during 
younger generations is due to exposure to Europeanised institutions during formative years, economic 
security and access to education. Shorrocks and de Guess (2019) also argue that generations are 
important – e.g. if formative years are spent in a non-democracy support will be higher for EU 
membership but, in addition to generational effects, they suggest lifelong learning about the EU plays a 
more important role. Daniel and Geys (2014) find that generational effects differ across country 
experiences -- younger generations in euro debtor countries are less supportive of fiscal integration than 
older generations reflecting different expectations about the costs and benefits. However, they do not 
investigate the dynamics of opinion across generations examining only a cross-section so difficult to 
separate what may be effects of ageing rather than generations.  
Understanding the role of gender dynamics in European integration processes over the past 20 years of 
EMU should yield novel insights given the unequal impact on women of policies to address the debt 
crisis (Karamessini and Rubery 2013; de la Porte and Heins 2016). Liebert (2009) highlights how elite 
discourses surrounding the introduction of the EMU may have implications for how these gender gaps 
emerged in different countries. In particular, the focus on the ‘monetarist’ character of EMU highlight 
the differences between women as full time workers and contributors to economic growth and women 
outside the formal labour market or only partially participating. Furthermore, the EMU as a 
‘predominantly market-driven and market expansion project’ is viewed as a threat to the social welfare 
system and domestic gender equality policies (Liebert 2009, p. 20). Hanmer (1996) has written that the 
EU ‘excludes most of women’s lives, in particular, the complexity of the connections between family, 
work, welfare and the labor market’ (p. 143, quoted in Vleuten 2007). These connections may be 
particularly important for understanding women’s support of the EMU. While much of the literature on 
public opinion has focused on economic conditions and labor force participation to explain support, 
these studies have not generally recognised how women’s relationship to the labor market may be 
different to that of men. Importantly, women’s participation in the labor force, the extent to which they 
engage in unpaid caring work and thus their financial insecurity and reliance on the state has changed 





Generational Change, Gender Gaps and Support for EMU – Expectations 
 
Based on these understandings of generations, gender, and support for the euro, we develop a set of 
expectations. First, in terms of generational change, we expect younger generations, in particular the 
generations whose only experience is of EMU, to be more supportive of EMU. We also expect their 
attitudes to be most resilient to shocks created by the financial crisis and austerity. These expectations 
are based on theories of socialization during the formative years and is in line with previous findings 
about generational differences in support for European integration. Secondly, for the gender gap in 
EMU support across these generations, increasing access to the same opportunities (e.g. education and 
increased labour force participation) for men and women will lead to a narrowing of the gender gap in 
support. Or at least, the interpretation from the cross-sectional research that those with higher level 
skills are more likely to benefit from increased market integration would suggest that, as access to 
educational outcomes increase for women, women’s support of EMU will begin to match the level of 
support among men. ON the other hand, skilled workers may also be less likely to suffer any negative 
consequences of monetary union or austerity. Rather than the gender gap shrinking due to women’s 
improved economic position, the gender gap could shrink as men’s enthusiasm for EMU wanes over 
time or as optimism about economic benefits of EMU wane. We also expect similar patterns to emerge 
among new Euro Area member states. 
 
Our third area of expectations about EMU support stems from the impact of the financial crisis. The 
impact of this financial crisis and subsequent related austerity will influence support, if at all, mostly 
among older generations who had lower levels of EMU support and whose support is more susceptible 
to periodic shocks such as the financial crisis. Furthermore, we expect that austerity should decrease 
support among women as result of the differential impact of austerity policies.  Fourth, bringing 
together the gender and generational arguments leads us to expect certain patterns of change over time. 
Most theories about EMU support draw on economic threat as an explanation and different experiences 
of ‘economic threat’ during formative years may lead a particular cohort of women to view EMU 
differently. As Anxo et al. (2010) write: “…changes in values and norms have profoundly modified the 
traditional family life-cycle model of marriage, parenthood, followed by retirement within a stable 
marriage, which was still prevalent during the 1950s–1960s.” These changes have had a significant 
impact on how women are integrated in the labour force, have access to education and are more 
financially independent. Thus, our expectation is that younger generations of women, if economic 
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explanations prevail, are more like younger generations of men. Thus, one of the explanations for a 
closing gender gap will be the generational replacement of women – those who mainly had 
responsibility for unpaid work are replaced by women who are more integrated into the labour force.  
 
Data and Methods 
The data we use to test examine these expectations come from the Standard Eurobarometer (EB) 
surveys conducted by the European Commission between 1998 and 2017. The EB series has been the 
source of data for other studies of euro support (e.g. Banducci et al. 2004, Banducci et al. 2009) and 
provides a rich longitudinal cross-national data set. We use the survey conducted in November of each 
year where respondents were asked the following question: “What is your opinion on each of the 
following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A 
European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro”.1 Survey respondents then 
indicate whether they are “For” or “Against” the statement. We use this question to measure a 
respondent’s support for EMU.  
We use the twenty-year period since EMU in order to capture any change with the introduction of the 
common currency and to extend the time series slightly. Because our hypotheses incorporate the impact 
of one’s experience with the euro, we limit our analysis to that countries that use the physical currency. 
We pool the EB surveys across 20 years and 12 member states since 1998 and 6 additional countries 
since 2004. We assign the over 250,000 respondents to one of 6 ‘euro generations’ in order to capture 
how EMU support develops over time for different cohorts. We assign respondents to these cohorts 
based on their year of birth.  
We take this notion of EU generations and construct 6 cohorts around the major events of European 
integration: WWII, Rome, Schuman, SEA & EP Elections, EMU and post-euro. For the post-euro 
group, these individuals would have only known the single currency in their country. These individuals 
would have been less than 15 in at the introduction of the euro so they did not experience any other 
currency, a powerful symbol of EMU, during their teenage and early adult years. This is an important 
 
1 There have been changes to the EMU/common currency question over time. For our time period, 
‘European Monetary Union’ was dropped in some years and then reintroduced. Most recent surveys 
use “Economic and Monetary Union”. In 1998, our only time point prior to EMU, the question asks 
only about the currency and EMU is dropped. From 2000 onwards, the wording ‘replacing the (national 
currency) and all other national currencies’ is dropped. Most of these changes happen in 2000 when we 
only have two data points prior to this date. 
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time for political learning. The other generations are defined in the following terms: 15-29yrs at EMU 
SEA/EP Elections; 30-45 yrs at EMU; Rome & Merger Treats; 46-60 yrs at EMU Schuman 
declaration; 61-70 yrs at EMU; WWII; 70+ yrs at EMU. This demarcation of generations aligns with 
the classification of generations by Downs and Wilson (2012). 
Aside from cohort and gender, our other main variables of interest are education. We are using 
education as proxy to represent accumulation of the types of skills necessary to benefit from monetary 
union but also to be less reliant on the welfare state (i.e. less vulnerable to the cuts in public spending 
due to austerity measures). Education is the measure we use to indicate financial vulnerability and is 
intended to capture those who are more at risk during the financial crisis or from inflationary effects of 
the introduction of the common currency. We use the harmonised measure of employment status where 
the categories are: self-employed; managers, other white collar, manual, house person, unemployed, 
retired and student. General orientation toward the EU is captured with a question asking whether the 
respondent has a negative or positive image of the EU. Possible answers range on a five-point scale 
from very positive to very negative. 
 
Results: Gender and Political Generations 
Our first step is to investigate whether the idea of political European generations yields any insights 
into the development of euro support. Our expectation is that the stage of Europeanisation when 
respondents in the EB survey came of age politically will influence how they view EMU. EMU support 
by cohort over the 20-year period for the original Euro Area countries (including Greece) is shown in 
Figure 1. The additional 6 Euro Area countries are shown in Figure 2. The lines plot the proportion of 
respondents in each cohort in each survey year who say they are ‘for’ the common currency where 
there is an orange line representing the women respondents and a green line for men respondents. The 
differences between each cohort figure represents generational differences while the change over time 
in each cohort represents the effects of time on support. This might be an aging effect, that opinions are 
shifting as respondent mature, or a general shift in support among all cohorts that is consistent with a 
period effect.  
There are a number of observations to make about the generational trends in support. There is a 
noticeable decline at 1999 among all cohorts after the introduction of the single currency. Also, for all 
but the youngest cohort women have lower levels of support than men. In the original Euro Area 
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member states (Figure 1), each successive generation is more supportive of EMU that the previous 
generations. The biggest differences, at the introduction of EMU are between the two older cohorts and 
the middle cohort with the post EMU cohort having the highest level of support. The biggest increases 
in support are across the generations of women. We do note that the gap between men and women 
becomes smaller in successive generations and the gap narrows over time as each cohort ages. This 
convergence of men’s and women’s support generally speeds up during austerity and reflects a decline 
of support among men rather than an increase in support among women exclusively. This descriptive 
generational analysis is helpful in pointing out both how age cohorts are increasingly supportive of 
EMU but how the dynamics of their support follow different trajectories over time. 
As per our expectations, we also see that across the older generation, there is a period effect: all 
generations seem influenced by the financial crisis and austerity measures. Indeed, the most significant 
decline in support is among the post-euro cohort. Support drops so significantly that by 2013 their level 
of support is not significantly different than most other cohorts. Rather than all cohorts exhibiting 
persistence, the older cohorts follow a pattern of increasing support while the middle cohort show 
stability after the initial dip in 2000 (Rome, SEA and EMU) while support has declined in the youngest 
cohort. These contrasting trends have led to a convergence in levels of support in the period of recovery 
since 2015. 
In Figure 2, we can see that the generational effects are not as large in the six new Euro Area countries. 
We note that the generations are based on the same age categories as Figure 1 for comparison purposes 
even though the introduction was later. Also, the youngest generation starts out with the lowest level of 
support. Support does decline amongst the countries at the time of the financial crisis but does make a 
recovery and similar to the original Euro Area member states there is a convergence of support among 
men and women but the gap was never as large as in the original countries. 
 
[Figure 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Multi-level Models 
As the next step in our analysis, we estimate a series of multi-level models by cohorts in order to 
examine how the structure of support changes for each generation. We first examine the impact of 
austerity and economic conditions on support among men and women for EMU. We test our 
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hypotheses about the differential impact of austerity on men and women by including a dummy 
variable indicating post-2008 surveys and individual level and country level indicators of (employment 
status, debt, deficit and social spending). If adverse conditions are more likely to persuade women that 
EMU is not a good idea, we should find an interaction effect such that the effect of these economic 
indicators has a larger negative impact for women.  
In Table 1, we have ignored the generational impact to focus on the impact of economic indicators and 
gender and included fixed effects for year of the survey and for country. By including fixed effects, we 
control for average levels of support in each member states and across time. The main findings here are 
that women’s support is more significantly impacted by macro-economic conditions than personal 
employment status. For example, in the model with employment status, when employment status would 
indicate greater vulnerability (unemployed and manual) there is no significant difference between men 
and women (see Figure 3). However, lower social expenditures have a more negative impact on 
women’s support particularly during austerity (see Figure 4). The takeaway is that maintaining the 
social welfare state (i.e. not reducing expenditures) is important to maintaining women’s support. 
Although debt has an impact, it is the same for men and women but women more influenced by social 
expenditures. This is an important point that we will come back to in the conclusion. 
[Table 1 and Figures 3 and 4 about here.] 
 
 
In Table 2 we expand our analysis to examine generational effects. We hypothesize that economic 
considerations would be less important for younger generations where experiences with EMU is more 
universal. Figure 5 shows the predicted level of euro support for men and women in the 20 years since 
EMU. In the model, we have controlled for variables representing economic threat at both the 
individual and country level. To estimate the dynamics of support in each generation, we have 
modelled time as a quadratic function because we hypothesise a negative impact of austerity but also 
the period of recovery since 2014 should be consistent with an increase in support. Our descriptive 
representations in Figures 1 and 2 also suggest a curvilinear relationship. 
[Table 2 and Figure 5 about here.] 
There are three observations about the results that are linked to our hypotheses. First, there are clear 
generational differences with younger generations showing higher levels of support. We note that the 
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biggest differences across generations is between generations of women and not men with each 
successive generation of women increasing in support – from a predicted level of average support at .5 
in the oldest generation to 1.2 in the youngest. For men, there is a slight increase – from .9 to 1.3. 
Second, the financial crisis and the ensuing period of austerity had a bigger impact on women across 
the generations than on men. Across all generations of women, there is a sharp decline in support 
around the time of the crisis whereas for men, the decline due to the financial crisis and austerity is not 
obvious. This is consistent with the results in Table 1 – that macroeconomic conditions, largely cuts in 
social expenditures, had a larger impact on women than on men. Previous research that found austerity 
did not have a negative impact on euro support and in some cases helped bolster support was mostly 
driven by support from men. However, we do see the recovery has had a much more significant impact 
on increasing positive sentiment among women than among men until we finally see a convergence of 
support among men and women in the final years. It is also of note that the convergence of the gender 
gap in euro support is not due to an increase of support among women. Indeed, men’s support across 
most generations (with the possible exception of the youngest cohort) has been declining slightly. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Our analysis demonstrates the importance not only of generational effects on public support for the 
euro, but also the closing of the gender gap over time. The closing of the gap is both due to increasing 
support among women post austerity, but also general declines of support among men.  That said, our 
analysis also confirms that euro support is not immune to the effects of austerity. We show that the 
austerity effect is notable for the impact on women, supporting the gendered framework and critique of 
the integration project and EMU. There are clear consequences of the austerity measures in terms of 
public support for the euro project as these measures are not gender neutral. These effects also hit 
harder those who are likely to be more financially vulnerable. Those with less education and who are 
unemployed are more vulnerable to the shocks and adjustments of austerity policies and this appears to 
influence support for EMU.  Policy makers should note that public support for the euro projects rests 
on minimizing the impacts on important parts of the population, whether gender or by employment.   
We also argued that a generational perspective is one way to recognise the contribution of the social 
and historical context in which one first experienced EMU to current political perceptions of the EU. 
The change in women’s economic experiences during the 20 year time period (e.g. increased 
participation in the labour force and education) will also shape how the gender gap in EMU support 
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varies across generations. Our analysis does reveal that different patterns emerge for older cohorts who 
seem resistant to the negative effects of the crisis on evaluations of EMU. Younger cohorts of women, 
while initially less supportive, were negatively affected by the crisis in terms of support but this support 
has recovered as the economy has recovered. These trends have led to a convergence of opinion on the 
euro where gender gaps are diminished in the most recent surveys. Importantly, EMU support among 
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Figure 1: Gender Differences in Euro Support in the 20 Years Since EMU – Original Euro Area Countries 
Source: EB Standard Surveys.  
Note: See text for explanation of cohorts. The lines indicate the proportion of respondents for each cohort in a year who say 
they are “For” a single currency. Green lines represent the proportion of male respondents who are “For the euro” while the 





Figure 2: Gender Differences in EMU Support in the 20 Years Since EMU – New Euro Area Countries 
Source: EB Standard Surveys.  
Note: See text for explanation of cohorts. The lines indicate the proportion of respondents for each cohort in a year who say 
they are “For” a single currency. Green lines represent the proportion of male respondents who are “For the euro” while the 
gold line represents the proportion of women who are ‘for the euro’. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 




Situation Economic Indicators 
Economic Indicators 
w/Austerity 
Female -0.302*** -0.304*** -0.414*** -0.349*** 
 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Manual  -0.461***                  
  -0.02                  
House Person  -0.410***                  
  -0.07                  
Unemployed  -0.807***                  
  -0.02                  
19 
 
Retired  -0.239***                  
  -0.02                  
Students  0.066*                  
  -0.03                  
Female*Manual  0.133***                  
  -0.02                  
Female*Houseperson  0.012                  
  -0.07                  
Female*Unemployed  0.265***                  
  -0.03                  
Female*Retired  -0.049*                  
  -0.02                  
Female*Student  0.061                  
  -0.04                  
Social Expenditure   0.104*** 0.070*** 
   -0.01 -0.01 
Debt   -0.010*** -0.009*** 
   0 0 
Deficit   0.018*** 0.016*** 
   0 0 
Female*Social 
Expenditure   0.010**                 
   0                 
Female*Debt   0.001*** 0.001*   
   0 0 
Austerity*Social 
Expenditure    0.010*   
    0 
Female*Social Expenditure   -0.015*** 
    0 
Female*Austerity*Social Expenditure   0.028*** 
    -0.01 
constant 1.184*** 1.453*** 1.334*** 1.491*** 
 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.1 
     
Random intercept                    
constant -0.576*** -1.815*** -1.624*** -1.622*** 
 -0.04 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 
     
N 315152 315152 302195 302195 
BIC 356218.9 359325.31 343974.41 343861.19 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001    
Note: Model includes year and country fixed effects though not reported in table. Compairons category for 




Figure 3: Gender & EMU Support – Conditional Impact of Employment Status 
 
 
Figure 4: Gender & EMU Support – Conditional Impact of Social Expenditures 
Source: EB Standard Surveys.  
Note: See text for explanation of cohorts. The lines indicate the proportion of respondents for each cohort in a year who say 
they are “For” a single currency. Green lines represent the proportion of male respondents who are “For the euro” while the 





Table 2: Generational Change and the Lifecycle: Gender and Support for EMU over time 
(Country fixed effects) 
 
Post-euro; 















61+ yrs at 
EMU 
      
Female -0.313 -0.14 0.09 0.031 0.022 
 -0.59 -0.11 -0.14 -0.22 -0.28 
Age -0.036*** 0.001 0.010*** 0.002 -0.007*   
 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Female*Age 0.016 0.000 -0.007* -0.002 -0.005 
 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Year/Time -0.08 -0.049*** -0.072*** -0.02 -0.002 
 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Year_sq 0.004 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.001 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Female*Year -0.053 -0.036* -0.027 -0.056*** -0.035*   
 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Female*Year_sq 0.003 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003**  
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Still Studying 1.610*** 1.782*** 0.804*** 0.279 0.505**  
 -0.19 -0.08 -0.2 -0.27 -0.19 
Education 0.069*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.087*** 0.096*** 
 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Social 
Expenditure 0.186*** 0.095*** 0.098*** 0.102*** 0.066**  
 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Debt -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.006*** 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Deficit 0.006 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 
 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
constant 0.74 0.396** -0.169 -0.574** -0.461 
 -0.5 -0.13 -0.14 -0.2 -0.25 
      
N 20907 76137 85800 71629 43287 
BIC 22686.03 83149.35 95625.09 79102.55 51168.72 
Note: Fixed effects for country and employment status estimated but not included in reported 
coefficients. 
* p<0.05, ** 







Figure 5: Generations & Gender: Predicted Levels of EMU Support 
Source: EB Standard Surveys.  
Note: See text for explanation of cohorts. The lines indicate the proportion of respondents for each cohort in a year who say 
they are “For” a single currency. Green lines represent the proportion of male respondents who are “For the euro” while the 
gold line represents the proportion of women who are ‘for the euro’. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
